[49 Pa.B. 2815]
[Saturday, June 1, 2019]

[Continued from previous Web Page]

§ 56.231. Reporting requirements.

 We proposed adding a new requirement at paragraph (a)(13) that requires the utility to report on its usage of electronic formats since Section 1406(b)(1)(ii)(C) now permits utilities to provide 3-day notice of termination by this method in addition to the current reporting of notices by telephone and in person.

 We proposed adding Subsections (b)(11), (b)(12), and (c) to incorporate the new reporting requirement at Section 1410.1(3) and (4) involving the annual reporting of accounts exceeding $10,000 in arrears and the number of medical certificates used by consumers. Section 1410 (relating to public utility duties). In its Tentative Order, the Commission identified the new reporting requirements at Section 1410.1 as a priority and asked parties to submit comments.

 Concerning the annual reporting of medical certificate usage, many parties summarized three possible interpretations of Section 1410.1(4), noting that it could be read as:

1. To require a single number: the number of medical certificates and renewals that have been submitted and accepted.

2. To require four separate numbers, as proposed in the Tentative Order: (1) the number of initial medical certificates submitted; (2) the number of initial medical certificates accepted; (3) the number of renewals submitted; and (4) the number of renewals accepted.

3. To require: (1) the number of medical certificates and renewals that have been submitted; and (2) the number of medical certificates and renewals that have been accepted.

 Many parties found that the third of these approaches is reasonable, and the Commission agreed. The Commission opined that the first interpretation, a single number, would not provide enough detail on a utility's role in overseeing medical certificates, and the second interpretation may require too much information, especially given the limitations in utility data-gathering abilities. The Commission stated that expanding this requirement to require further itemization is best left to the instant rulemaking where this issue can be fully vetted, and we accordingly invited parties to comment on this.

 Concerning the annual reporting of accounts with arrears exceeding $10,000, the Commission noted that this reporting requirement appears to differ significantly from the traditional utility reporting requirements. Most traditional reporting requirements consist of aggregate data (numbers, sums, totals, averages, etc.). However, with the direction to report annually ''residential customer accounts which have accumulated $10,000 or more in arrearages,'' it appears that the General Assembly envisioned the reporting of specific accounts in lieu of a ''number of accounts'' or ''averages.'' If this section is interpreted to mean that utilities are expected to submit account specific data, this presents us with another series of questions. Assuming specific customer accounts are to be reported to the Commission, we asked parties to comment upon what information concerning these accounts is needed and appropriate. We noted that the information reported has to be sufficient for the effective monitoring of utility collection practices while at the same time not compromising the customers' privacy, especially in the context of the Commonwealth's Right-to-Know Law.¹⁷ In the Implementation Order, we also noted that, while the statute specifies that this reporting should take place ''annually,'' it is silent as to the precise timing and methodology. We invited comments as to whether the Commission should designate an annual ''snapshot'' date for these reports or possible alternatives to the ''snapshot'' approach.

 Upon careful review of the comments submitted by the parties, we provided the following guidance concerning the data required to comply with Section 1410.1(3):

 A. Utilities shall examine their active (i.e. accounts not final-billed) residential accounts at the conclusion of each calendar year. Any account with an arrearage at or exceeding $10,000 at the time of this ''snapshot'' shall be reported to the Commission by April 1 of the following year.

 B. Accounts where someone has presented a Protection From Abuse (PFA) order, or a court order which provides clear evidence of domestic violence, to the utility shall not be included in the reporting regardless of the level of arrearages.

 C. Each account reported shall be identified to the Commission with a unique label that the utility can match to the account in question. The same unique identifier for each account shall be used in any subsequent reporting to identify that same account.

 D. Customer names, addresses, account numbers, phone numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers or any other information that could be used to identify the customer shall not be included.

 E. The information concerning each of the accounts shall include the following:

 1. Unique account identifier;

 2. The account balance as of the time of the ''snapshot;''

 3. The date the account was established;

 4. The average monthly bill amount for the previous 12 months;

 5. The number of Commission informal or formal complaints;

 6. The number of company payment arrangements;

 7. The number of times the customer's service was terminated for non-payment.

 F. Reporting shall begin, under these interim guidelines, with calendar year 2015—with the first annual report due to the Commission by April 1, 2016.

 G. The Commission may request more detailed follow-up information on specific accounts.

 H. Reports shall be filed at Docket No. M-2014-2448824, with an electronic copy sent to the Director of the Commission's Bureau of Consumer Services.

 I. Reports shall be formatted per a specific electronic spreadsheet format provided by Commission staff. The Commission will provide this electronic format by September 1, 2015.

 (Implementation Order at page 18.)

 Customer names, addresses, account numbers, phone numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers or any other information that could be used to identify the customer shall not be included. ''Rate class'' is not necessary as a data point because this reporting is applicable only to residential customers, per the definition of ''customer'' at Section 1403 and the language of Section 1410.1(3), which specifies ''residential customer accounts.''

 Finally, we proposed revising § 56.231 by adding new Subsection (d). It is important to note that this is not a new requirement. We are simply consolidating the utility reporting requirement rules in Chapter 56 into one section—§ 56.231. The new Subsection (d) can currently be found in § 56.461, which we propose to eliminate. Consolidation will assist utilities in locating and complying with these requirements.

 PGW requests that the Commission reconsider this determination and exclude Customer Assistance Program (CAP) customers' frozen arrearages from the $10,000 reporting requirements. The reason for this request is because of the nature of the uncollectible amounts associated with CAP customers (in contrast to non-CAP residential customers). For CAP customers, pre-program arrears are essentially ''frozen'' with a fraction of the arrears being forgiven for every timely CAP payment. Thus, for CAP customers in good standing, PGW has no ''collection'' tools available for these amounts that will be forgiven over time and they are truly uncollectible. For non-CAP customers, however, PGW does not foresee forgiving debts on these accounts; they remain outstanding and collectible. Including both collectible and non-collectible amounts will not present an accurate picture of PGW's collection practices or its accounts. Therefore, excluding CAP customers' pre-CAP arrearages from this reporting is consistent with the intent of Section 1410.1. It is also consistent with the data that is currently reported for the Universal Services Reporting Requirements, as well as the remaining § 56.231 reporting requirements. (PGW at 8-9).

 Columbia's comments echo those provided by the EAP as both Columbia and the EAP propose that additional data points (including but not limited to bankruptcies and theft of service) should be included in the reports given to the Commission by the utilities. (Columbia at 8-9; EAP at 20-21).

 Duquesne recommends adoption of the April 1 deadline for both reports. Duquesne requests that the Commission provide further guidance on the accounts that should be excluded or included in the report. The concept of a ''snapshot'' in time, specifically the end of the calendar year, and the April 1 due date for the report are consistent with the requirements in § 53.231 as proposed and the company has no issue with either proposal. However, at that particular moment, an account that is in arrears and active (i.e., not final billed) can have both a balance in excess of $10,000 and be subject to other conditions that affect the collectability of the account. During preparation of its first annual report in 2016, Duquesne had several accounts that did not fall neatly into the definition of ''active'' above. For example, a question arose whether an account with a disputed amount that, if included, would reach the $10,000 threshold should be reported. Another instance involved an account in which a portion of the balance had been referred to an outside collection agency. Upon direction from Commission staff, Duquesne included disputed amounts in identifying reportable accounts, but did not include accounts where a portion had been referred to outside collection. While Duquesne is not requesting that an additional regulatory requirement be added or that § 56.231 as proposed be revised, they are seeking further clarification from the Commission that only amounts for which Duquesne can actively collect on should be reported, which excludes other amounts such as those associated with disputes, bankruptcy, or where final bills have been submitted.

 Further, while Duquesne appreciates the Commission's attempts to clarify elements in the report requirements and definitions therein, unfortunately, changing definitions does not mean that information that is captured can be as easily changed. Specifically, Duquesne does not separately track the annual collections operating expenses directly attributable to customer assistance programs because it is not practical or cost efficient to create separate business practices to carve out the information that would be required to meet this requirement. Regarding the other definitions related to reporting requirements, Duquesne has no comments. If they are able to transition to email communications related to terminations, it will ensure that the requested information can be captured. (Duquesne at 6-7, 16).

 EAP recommends the inclusion of the accounts' use of medical certificates. EAP also believes that the Commission and the legislature may be informed by the inclusion of other data points in this report not limited to: whether the accounts are involved in a bankruptcy filing; whether the accounts involved the termination process and a Utility Report; whether the accounts have engaged in theft of service; and whether the accounts have filed high bill disputes. EAP recommends that the Commission also consider the exclusion of CAP pre-program arrears, as these dollars are ''frozen'' by the customer's participation in the program and, therefore, are uncollectable by the utility. These additional data points can show whether, and potentially for how long, accounts have been able to accrue additional balances by way of continuing to delay payment and still avoid termination. (EAP at 20-21).

 OCA submits that the implementation of the Chapter 14 reporting requirements should carefully balance the Commission's mandate to analyze utility collection practices against the significant consumer privacy concerns raised by providing specific customer account information to the Commission. The OCA submits that if customer account information is to be collected, great care must be taken to protect privacy. OCA submits that the data should not be a ''snapshot'' in time but should include all accounts that had a balance exceeding $10,000 during the reporting period. A snapshot would not provide an accurate picture as it could be subject to seasonality or even an effort by the utility to clear those accounts with arrearage balances which meet the reporting threshold just before the snapshot date.

 OCA also submits that the Commission should require the utility to provide the Commission with information regarding the company's collections process and a clear explanation of the steps the utility takes to collect past due balances beginning with the first instance of an arrearage. The OCA submits that the utility should then be required to report to the Commission on the utility's collection steps over the life of the arrearage from its inception up to the time that the account crosses the $10,000 arrearage threshold for the accounts over $10,000. Again, aggregate data could be used. By way of example, if a phone call reminder is the first step, the total number of accounts that received such a reminder should be provided. Also, the total number of accounts with no collection activity should be identified.

 If account level data reporting is required for all accounts with a balance exceeding $10,000, aggregated data should also be provided in addition to account level data. The OCA recommends the collection of additional data points for the aggregate set of consumers with arrearages in excess of $10,000 broken out by confirmed low income and total residential, as is the BCS collection reporting. This data should include:

 • The number of accounts with arrears in excess of $10,000;

 • The total dollars of arrears in accounts with arrears over $10,000 (not simply the dollars over $10,000, but the total dollars in accounts with arrears over $10,000);

 • The number of accounts that have been treated through a company-sponsored usage reduction program;

 • The length of time it took the arrearage to accumulate from the first past due balance until reaching the $10,000 threshold (a long-term equivalent of the aging of the arrears);

 • The number of payment arrangements (i.e. a distribution analysis of the number of accounts receiving 1, 2, 3, etc. payment arrangements);

 • The number of accounts that were subject to medical certificates; and

 • The total number of accounts that were worked through each step of the utility's collections process.

 The OCA submits that these data points will allow the Commission to determine whether the utility's collections processes and steps are effective and to provide the Commission with meaningful information about consumer accounts that have reached the reporting threshold. Regarding medical certificate reporting, the OCA supports the Commission's proposed guidelines as detailed in the Tentative Order. (OCA at 22—25).

Discussion

 First, we will address the annual reporting of medical certificates. OCA submits that we should use our proposal from the Chapter 14 Implementation Tentative Order, Docket No. M-2014-2448824 (Order entered January 15, 2015). Parties commented on our initial proposal and in the Chapter 14 Implementation Final Order, Docket No. M-2014-2448824 (Order entered July 9, 2015) and we agreed with the parties that requiring two separate numbers was reasonable. Upon careful review and consideration, we believe our proposal is sound. We think that requiring two separate numbers, (1) the number of medical certificates and renewals that have been submitted and (2) the number of medical certificates and renewals that have been accepted, strikes the correct balance.

 Next, we will address the annual reporting of accounts exceeding $10,000. OCA believes that the General Assembly's purpose in monitoring utility collection activities can be fulfilled with the use of aggregate data and general descriptions of utility collection actions and procedures. While we agree that aggregate data can be of some use for these purposes, we think the intent of the General Assembly was to go beyond general data. If the General Assembly had just wanted general, aggregate data (totals, averages, percentages, etc.) easily it could have asked for such. In fact, it did just that in paragraph (4) where it specifies ''number'' when discussing the reporting of medical certificates. The lack of the word ''number,'' as in ''number of accounts,'' in paragraph (3) concerning the $10,000 arrearage reporting requirement cannot be ignored. Accordingly, we will maintain our proposal that this reporting requirement refers to specific, individual customer accounts.

 The parties offered many different opinions on just what type of accounts should be or should not be included in the reporting. Several parties pointed out account-types that they think should be excluded from this reporting requirement for various reasons. These include:

 • CAP accounts;

 • Bankruptcy-related accounts;

 • Accounts on an amortization or payment agreement;

 • Accounts involving theft or unauthorized use;

 • Accounts involving civil litigation;

 • Accounts associated with a PFA.

 The rationale offered for the possible exemption for most of these is that traditional collection tools are not necessarily available for these types of accounts. However, the reporting requirement at Section 1410.1 makes no mention of the applicability of various collection methods available; this section simply refers to ''accounts.'' If the General Assembly had intended this reporting requirement to be specifically targeted to accounts subject to specific collection methods or subject to a specific law or regulation, it could have done so. To the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly created this reporting requirement to specifically gauge the impact of various collection practices and various regulations and laws. For the Commission to omit a variety of accounts to the extent advocated by the parties would impermissibly thwart the will of the General Assembly.

 However, we agree with parties that sought to exempt from the reporting requirement those accounts that involve a customer with a PFA or other court order that provides evidence of domestic violence. Including PFA accounts could intrude on the privacy and security of PFA holders; a key to the security and privacy for any PFA holder is to limit the disclosure of such information to only those who have an important need to know. For the purposes of this reporting requirement, we do not find the grounds for asking for this information and including it in the reporting is sufficient to warrant the possible risks to the privacy and security of PFA holders. Accordingly, we will exclude these accounts among the accounts reported under the proposed § 56.231(c).

 In addition to our proposed data points, parties also offered many suggestions on just what information about the accounts should or should not be included in this report. The total list of possible data points submitted by the parties is quite extensive and includes the following:

 1. Account balance as of the time of the ''snapshot;''

 2. Time period over which the arrearage accrued (in years or months);

 3. Average monthly bill amount;

 4. Number of Commission informal or formal complaints;

 5. Number of company payment arrangements;

 6. Rate class;

 7. Whether the ratepayer is a landlord ratepayer;

 8. Multiple meter or single meter property;

 9. History of LIURP services;

 10. Indication of whether de facto electric heating is occurring at the premise;

 11. Customer name;

 12. Number of payments in the last 24 months;

 13. Number of energy assistance payments in the last 24 months;

 14. Participation in CAP;

 15. Balance when removed from CAP;

 16. Customer current income level;

 17. Number of medical certificates filed;

 18. Number of NSF checks or use of an invalid credit card;

 19. Number of times the customer filed bankruptcy and dollars associated with bankruptcy;

 20. Number of times customer reported a change in income;

 21. Number of 10-day notices issued in last 24 months;

 22. Number of times the customer was shut-off for non-payment;

 23. Date of last shut-off;

 24. Move-in date;

 25. Last payment made;

 26. Total customer payments;

 27. Number of times dispute rights were offered;

 28. Whether balance transfers from previous accounts contributed to the arrearage;

 29. Whether a PFA has issued;

 30. Indicator of meter-access problems.

 While many of the above items that the parties suggested are interesting, most are not critical for our intended purposes at this time. We must be mindful of the burdens on utilities to compile this information. And, since the reporting of accounts exceeding $10,000 began in 2015, the number of accounts with a balance of $10,000 or more has declined. This requirement appears to be working as intended and does not need extensive changes.

 Below is the data that has been filed under Docket No. M-2014-2448824:

Number of Residential Accounts with a balance of $10,000 or more
	2015	2016	2017
ELECTRIC UTILITIES	539	474	424
NATURAL GAS UTILITIES	413	352	254
WATER UTILITIES	8	6	9
TOTAL	960	831	687
* Class A Water Utilities only. Class A Water Utility—A water utility with annual revenues greater than $1 million. (52 Pa. Code § 56.2).

 After considering the above and the comments of the parties, we are staying with our original proposal with one addition. We believe there is value in knowing what, if any, collection activity a utility has taken on these accounts. Therefore, we are adding the number of 10-day termination notices issued on an account. In addition, the Commission may request additional information on specific accounts.

 To summarize, we will include the following data points in the reporting requirement:

 1. Unique account identifier;

 2. Account balance as of the time of the ''snapshot;''

 3. Date the account was established;

 4. The average monthly bill amount for the previous 12 months;

 5. The number of Commission informal or formal complaints;

 6. The number of company payment arrangements;

 7. Number of times the customer's service was terminated for non-payment;

 8. Number of 10-day termination notices issued.

 We would also like to provide some guidance for these reporting requirements. We did not receive sufficient comments one way or the other regarding establishing a timeframe for these reporting requirements and, therefore, are hesitant to add it to the regulations. We believe that items 5, 6, 7, and 8 should all be based on item 3, the date the account was established. We recognize the various record keeping rules and that some information may not be available beyond four years. In addition, if any problems or issues arise, we can revisit it later. Therefore, we are issuing guidance that public utilities will provide whatever information they can for items 5, 6, 7, and 8 from the date the account was established.

 We reiterate that data points that can identify the customer such as their name, address, account number, and Social Security number are not to be included, nor should there be any mention of PFA-involvement. ''Rate class'' is not necessary because this reporting is applicable only to residential customers, per the definition of ''customer'' at Section 1403 and the language of Section 1410.1(3), which specifies ''residential customer accounts.''

 Concerning the format of the reporting, several parties encouraged the Commission to allow for electronic submission via a secure web portal, similar to what is already currently used for 52 Pa. Code §§ 54.75 and 56.231 reporting. We agree that ultimately this is the preferred format. Once the final regulations are adopted concerning this reporting requirement, the Bureau of Consumer Services will set up a permanent web portal for this purpose. In the interim, as we proposed in the Tentative Order, an electronic spreadsheet should be sufficient for this purpose. Commission staff will develop and distribute a formatted electronic spreadsheet. In the interim, this docket can serve as the repository for the reports. Additionally, for consistency with the 52 Pa. Code §§ 54.75 and 56.231 reporting, these reports should be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Services by electronic mail. Electronic versions will allow for sorting and aggregation if desired. We note that per the discussion above, these reports will not include data that can be used to identify any customer; therefore, security is less of an issue. A key concept in data security is to limit the amount of sensitive data one is handling, and we have done that with these proposed regulations.

Section 1417 and Protections for Victims of Domestic Violence.

 We invited parties to comment on any matters relating to the protection from abuse (PFA) subchapters L—V and the language in the amended 66 Pa.C.S. § 1417, ''or a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth, which provides clear evidence of domestic violence against the applicant or customer.'' We further invited commentators to offer suggested language relating to these other court orders.

 LICRG notes that these provisions provide critical protections for victims of domestic violence, who face extreme physical safety and economic instability when separating from an abusive intimate partner. For example, a victim cannot be held responsible for debts and arrearages accrued by an abuser, and they are provided with additional flexibility in negotiating a payment arrangement based on the individual's unique facts and circumstances, rather than falling within the rigid timeframes established in Chapter 14. In its Proposed Rulemaking Order, the Commission tracked language from the statute, without providing additional clarification on the scope of order that could be affected. However, LICRG believes that there are inherent ambiguities in the statute which must be resolved to fully implement the Chapter 14 exemption for victims of domestic violence in a manner consistent with the intent of the General Assembly.

 LICRG points to several ''orders'' that may contain ''clear evidence of domestic violence''—including civil and criminal orders, such as divorce, custody, child protection, criminal convictions, and sentencing. Moreover, many court orders contain clear evidence of domestic violence, but lack critical facts necessary for the utility to interpret the order. For example, a criminal charging order for assault by an abuser against a victim contains clear evidence of domestic violence; however, the charging order itself is unlikely to contain an attestation of the relationship between the offender and their victim. There is also potential for conflicting interpretation by utilities about when a court order is from ''a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth.'' For example, protection orders issued by a court from another jurisdiction are explicitly recognized and enforced by Pennsylvania's courts, pursuant to the Protection From Abuse Act. And, the Full Faith and Credit provision of the United States Constitution explicitly ensures that court orders issued in one state are recognized and enforceable in all other states.

 LICRG believes that the implementation of the Chapter 14 exemption for victims of domestic violence is complicated and requires the input and advice of professionals who are not often before the Commission. LICRG suggests that the Commission commit to launching a work group comprised of representatives from BCS, Law Bureau, the utilities, statutory advocates, advocates for victims of domestic violence (such as PCADV), representatives of consumer groups, and other interested stakeholders. The purpose of this work group would be to provide specific recommendations to the Commission regarding necessary guidance and interpretation of the statutory exemption that could be developed into a policy statement to be universally applied across utility service territories. (LICRG at 48—52).

 LICRG agrees with IRRC that the public safety is not adequately protected without clear guidance to ensure that the protections for victims of domestic violence are implemented appropriately to fulfill the intent of the General Assembly in exempting this vulnerable population from harsh credit, billing, collection, and termination standards. LICRG urges the Commission to proceed with care by setting forth explicit language and employing a deliberative process which considers responsive input and recommendations from a variety of stakeholders. The Commission should strongly encourage the participation of subject matter experts and organizations that provide assistance to domestic violence survivors. (LICRG Additional Comment at 31-32).

 The Joint Commenters note that the domestic violence exemption recognizes that victims of domestic violence need unique protections from certain collection and billing practices which may place them at an increased risk of physical or financial harm. The Joint Commenters believe that the exemption has not been fully implemented and that they often have to assist clients who report that utility call center employees are confused when they disclose that they are a victim of domestic violence or that they have a PFA or other court order. As a result, many who qualify for the special billing, collections, and termination rules are not able to access these protections.

 The Joint Commenters believe that there has never been clear and consistent policy guidance from the Commission to ensure that victims of domestic violence are held to the appropriate billing, collections, and termination standards, pursuant to Section 1417. They note that implementation of the domestic violence exemption is complicated; indeed, domestic violence is adjudicated across an array of legal matters and court jurisdictions, and there are nuances to each which require careful consideration before implementing policies and procedures. Accordingly, the Joint Commenters recommend that the Commission retain its proposed language codifying the expanded statutory exemption, and, like LICRG, ask the Commission to convene a working group. The purpose of this working group would be to develop recommendations to the Commission about guidance and interpretation of this statutory language that could be developed into a policy statement to be universally applied across utility service territories. It could also further assist the Commission with other implementation issues, such as developing appropriate notice of the domestic violence exemption to consumers, training materials, and confidentiality protocols for handling sensitive information about a customer's status as a victim of domestic violence. (Joint Commenters at 24—27).

 Regarding the revised Section 1417, OCA declares that many terms included in this provision are unclear as to how they should be interpreted and applied. Questions raised by this language include: what types of orders qualify; how should an order from a court in another state be handled; what constitutes ''domestic violence''; and what qualifies as ''clear evidence'' of domestic violence? This language is ambiguous in many respects and domestic violence is a complex issue and as such the OCA does not believe it is appropriate to propose specific language in these comments. Rather, the OCA, like LICRG and the Joint Commenters, submits that the Commission should convene a working group consisting of a variety of stakeholders, and that this group would work collaboratively to develop guidance as to how this language should be applied going forward. This guidance could then be the subject of a separate Policy Statement adopted by a final Commission Order. (OCA at 4-5).

 Duquesne states that it supports efforts to reduce adverse effects of domestic violence and the havoc it wreaks on families and children in our community and it takes seriously its obligations as a utility to protect its customers who have been victims of such violence and has procedures to afford such protections as required. Duquesne reports that the courts within its service territory have developed consistent forms and procedures for PFA proceedings. The commonality of format afforded by the courts' actions has enabled Duquesne to develop, implement and adhere to consistent handling of matters involving PFAs. The additional language in Section 1417 that requires utilities to accept a ''court order . . . which provides clear evidence of domestic violence,'' without more detail, places utilities in the untenable position of interpreting and then determining whether ''clear evidence'' of domestic violence exists.

 While Duquesne is aware of suggestions to seek determination from in-house legal counsel or expertise from domestic violence agencies when faced with such dilemmas, it does not feel this is an adequate resolution of the issue. In addition to seeking guidance as to what types of court orders, other than PFAs, show ''clear evidence of domestic violence,'' Duquesne is concerned about the lack of time limitation associated with such orders. The Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act, as codified in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(d), specifically provides that the protection order ''shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed three years.'' Upon petition to the court, a PFA can be extended and a new PFA can be obtained should it be necessary, extending protection for another three years. By contrast, a ''court order'' may be silent on the period of time it covers, which potentially translates into a permanent exemption from Chapter 14. Duquesne asks that the Commission consider the issues attendant with unspecified court orders and facilitate conversation around application of these orders through a working group or other process in order to remove these current ambiguities. (Duquesne at 8-9).

 PPL is concerned that the broad language of the new PFA provisions puts the utility in the role of interpreting court orders and determining what constitutes ''clear evidence'' of domestic violence. Absent clear direction from the Commission, PPL believes that this broad language could lead to customer complaints any time a utility determines that a customer's court order does not constitute ''clear evidence'' of domestic violence. Moreover, specific guidelines will help ensure that victims of domestic violence are properly identified by the utilities. PPL offers the following definitions that it believes could give utilities some guidance when determining whether a court order provides clear evidence of domestic violence:

Clear evidence: defined as a statement or finding contained in the court order that the customer or member of the household is a victim of domestic violence;

Domestic violence: defined as violence between family members, as defined in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102, relating to PFAs (i.e., spouses or persons who have been spouses, persons living as spouses or who lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, current or former sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood); and

Court of competent jurisdiction: is defined as a magisterial district court, court of common pleas, or appellate court.

(PPL at 12-13).

Discussion

 The parties have provided helpful comments on addressing this critical issue. LICRG helpfully lists the types of court orders that could fall under Section 1417 and PPL offers some proposed language to define some key terms. Many of the parties have emphasized the complexity of the issues involved and the difficulty of formulating specific proposals in the context of a formal rulemaking. Concerns have also been expressed that we need to call on a wider range of expertise than those who traditionally participate in rulemakings, such as the current one. Accordingly, LICRG, Joint Commenters, OCA and Duquesne all advise the Commission to instead form a working group where these matters can be discussed by all interested parties.

 We find this advice convincing and agree with the Joint Commenters that the Commission should retain its proposed language codifying the expanded statutory exemption, and then convene a working group of all interested stakeholders. The purpose of this working group would be to develop recommendations to the Commission about guidance and interpretation of Section 1417 that could lead to the development of a policy statement to be applied across utility service territories. This group could also advise the Commission on other implementation issues, such as developing appropriate notice of the domestic violence exemption to consumers, training and consumer education materials, and confidentiality expectations for handling information about a customer's status as a victim of domestic violence. The comments submitted on these matters, as noted above, can serve as the initial discussion points for the working groups exploration of these issues.

Subchapters L—V and Protections for Victims of Domestic Violence

 In Section 1417 (relating to nonapplicability), the General Assembly determined that Chapter 14 would not cover customers protected by a PFA order or customers with a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth which provides clear evidence of domestic violence against the applicant or customer. Accordingly, at the same time the Commission is complying with the Act by amending the provisions of Chapter 56 regulations to comply with the revised legislation and declared policy, we still need to account for the General Assembly's decision to exclude these customers. We addressed this in the 2011 rulemaking by creating two separate bodies of regulation; one clearly reflecting Chapter 14 (subchapters A—K), and the other free of Chapter 14 requirements, except where the Chapter 14 requirement provides a consumer benefit (subchapters L—V).

 This bifurcation is necessary because the General Assembly made it clear that Chapter 14 does not apply to certain customers (those with a PFA or a court order providing evidence of domestic violence). At the same time, we must account for provisions of Chapter 14 that provide benefits to consumers and extend these benefits to these consumers. It is nonsensical to think that the General Assembly wanted these consumers to have fewer protections than other customers.

 We proposed continuing this approach to maintain separate subchapters (L—V) within Chapter 56 for customers not covered by Chapter 14, while expanding the applicability of subchapters L—V to not only all customers who have been granted protection from abuse orders but also to customers with a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth which provides clear evidence of domestic violence against the applicant or customer, as to align with revised Section 1417. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1417 (relating to nonapplicability). Additionally, as to align with the revised definition of public utility at Section 1403 (relating to definitions), we proposed to remove the applicability of these same subchapters to wastewater, steam heat, and small natural gas companies. The applicable subchapters for these entities will be B through K—the same as other utilities. See § 56.1, Statement of purpose and policy.

 No party voiced serious objections or concerns with this proposal, so we will proceed with maintaining subchapters L—V with some revisions as we will now discuss in detail.

§ 56.252. Definitions.

 The definitions of public utility, small natural gas distribution utility, steam heat utility, and wastewater utility have been revised to reflect the revised Chapter 14 definitions at Section 1403. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1403 (relating to definitions).

 A definition of physician assistant has been added since Chapter 14 now permits the filing of medical certificates by physician assistants. Accordingly, we think it is important that this term be defined. This revision provides additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V. We kept this definition and the revised definitions for nurse practitioner and physician the same as those in § 56.2 for consistency.

 We proposed revising the definition of billing month as to allow short-period bills in instances where a customer's change of commodity supplier necessitates the issuance of a short-period bill in order to effectuate a timely switch of supplier. Recent regulatory changes intended to accelerate the switching of electric generation service now make it possible to switch commodity service in as little as three business days. See 52 Pa. Code §§ 57.173, 57.174 and 57.180. Some utilities, as part of the switching process, will issue a final short-period bill for the customer's current supplier so that billing with the new supplier can start within the three-business day timeframe. The Commission has already issued temporary waivers of the § 56.2 definition of billing month to facilitate this process,¹⁸ and we believe it is necessary to codify this change in billing procedures to eliminate the need for repeated waivers in the future.

 Duquesne believes that the definition of applicant and customer as set forth in § 56.2 should be aligned in § 56.252 for consistency of application of the regulations and to ensure that the definitions in § 56.252 adhere to the revised Chapter 14. When comparing these two Sections, § 56.2 is more specific and in line with Act 155, whereas § 56.252 needs some additions in order to be consistent with the definitions contained in § 56.2. (Duquesne at 11).

 IRRC also notes that the definition of applicant differs significantly between §§ 56.2 and 56.252. In particular, the definitions use different time periods in Paragraph (ii) of 30 days versus 60 days and asks the PUC to explain why the definitions of this term need to differ between §§ 56.2 and 56.252.

Discussion

 In response to the concerns expressed by IRRC and Duquesne, who point to the differences between the definitions of applicant and customer in § 56.252 compared to § 56.2, we note that this distinction was deliberate and based upon the directive in Section 1417 that Chapter 14 shall not apply to victims of domestic violence. The ''missing'' language in the proposed § 56.252 is language found in the revised Chapter 14 definitions of applicant and customer.

 The current definition of applicant in § 56.252 gives a victim of domestic violence a 60-day window to obtain new utility service after a termination or discontinuance without being considered an applicant. In effect, they retain the rights of a customer, meaning that they do not have to submit to credit screening to transfer or establish service within the 60-day window. If we applied the new 30-day window as found in the reauthorized Chapter 14, we believe this would impermissibly apply a Chapter 14 provision that would result in less protection for a victim of domestic violence. Accordingly, we think it is appropriate to maintain the 60-day period in the definition of applicant as we proposed. The 60-day window also aligns with the pre-Chapter 14 definition of applicant as was found at § 56.2.

 However, upon further consideration, we do think we need to reconsider our proposed definition of customer at § 56.252. The current § 56.252 definition has no mention of timeframe for which one remains a customer, and our proposed language did not change this. Upon further consideration, we are concerned that the lack of a timeframe may cause confusion for both customers and utilities and could possibly result in a victim of domestic violence receiving less protection than they are entitled to per Section 1417. Accordingly, we will add to the definition of customer the same 60-day window found in the definition of applicant. This 60-day period is also the same period found in the pre-Chapter 14 definition of ratepayer as was found at § 56.2.

§ 56.262. Meter reading; estimated billing; customer readings.

 We proposed adding a new paragraph (6), Verification of automatic meter reading, to incorporate the new requirement at Section 1411 that utilities verify meter readings at the request of the customer. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1411 (relating to automatic meter readings). This revision provides additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V.

 Consistent with the OCA's comments regarding § 56.12 above, the OCA supports the addition of this provision, with one modification. The OCA suggests that the Commission either update the definition of AMR to include AMI or add a separate new definition of AMI that should be reflected throughout these regulations. Consistent with that recommendation, as well as the OCA's recommendation regarding § 56.12, the OCA submits that consumers should have the same right to verification for automatic meter readings obtained through AMI as is being included in this section for AMR. If the definition of AMR in § 56.252 is updated to include AMI, then automatic meter readings obtained through AMI will receive the same right to verification of automatic meter readings at the customer requests. If a separate definition of AMI is added to § 56.252, then language indicating that automatic meter readings obtained through AMI are also subject to verification on the customer's request will need to be inserted into this section. (OCA at 27-28).

Discussion

 As discussed above relative to §§ 56.2 and 56.12, we think current references to AMR—Automatic meter reading are sufficient and additional revisions are unnecessary. While the definition does apply to an older technology that predates the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) that is currently being deployed by many electric utilities, we think the language in this definition (''Metering using technologies that automatically read and collect data from metering devices and transfer that data to a central database for billing and other purposes'') is general and broad enough to capture AMI as well.

§ 56.281. Policy Statement.

 Duquesne suggests that we update the non-discrimination standards found in the Policy Statement at § 56.281. (Duquesne at 11-12). We agree that it is time to update these sections to reflect a broader scope of protections and will use Governor Wolf's Executive Orders, signed on April 7, 2016, which provide protections for employment and contracting within the Commonwealth as an example. Accordingly, we will add ''color, religious creed, ancestry, union membership, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, AIDS or HIV status or disability'' to § 56.281 as we did with § 56.31.

§ 56.282. Credit standards.

 We proposed a new paragraph (4) to align with the new Section 1404(a.1) prohibition on CAP-eligible customers and applicants paying deposits. This revision provides additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V.

 OCA, as they discussed in relation to § 56.32(e), asks the Commission to clarify that eligibility for CAP in this context is based on income eligibility, not on eligibility based on some other criteria. (OCA at 28). Similar concerns expressed by LICRG, Joint Commenters, and CAC in relation to § 56.32(e) are also relevant to § 56.282. LICRG notes that it is unlikely that the nuances of each utility's CAP eligibility requirements were what the General Assembly had in mind when it set out this restriction on requiring security deposits. As CAC points out that using household income to determine eligibility has the benefit of establishing a uniform, statewide standard that can be consistently applied. And the Joint Commenters note that we have to account for water utilities that do not have CAP programs and thus do not have CAP-eligibility criteria. (OCA at 9—12; LICRG at 18—27; CAC at 6—9; Joint Commenters at 18—21).

Discussion

 Concerning the proposed prohibition on requiring deposits from customers that are CAP-eligible at § 56.32(e), OCA, LICRG and CAC ask us to clarify that this standard is referring to eligibility based upon the customer's household income, and not on other miscellaneous eligibility criteria that can vary by utility. This same concern is relevant to §§ 56.282 and 56.291. We agree with OCA and LICRG that it is unlikely that the nuances of each utility's CAP eligibility requirements were what the General Assembly had in mind when it set out this restriction on requiring security deposits. Also, as CAC points out, using household income to determine eligibility has the benefit of establishing a uniform, statewide standard that can be consistently applied. We agree with the Joint Commenters that the Commission's Policy Statement on Customer Assistance Programs at § 69.265 and the 150% of the Federal poverty level eligibility threshold is a logical reference. It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly was aware of this threshold in reauthorizing Chapter 14. Accordingly, as we did with § 56.32, we shall insert language here to the effect that the customer is confirmed to be eligible for a customer assistance program if she or he provides income information to the public utility which verifies that the household income meets the program's income eligibility standard.

 Regarding the concerns expressed about this same Section by LICRG that it is eligibility and not actual enrollment into CAP that determines the customer's exemption from deposit requirements, we agree and point out that this Section specifies ''eligible''—not ''enrolled'' or ''participating.'' We think this language is sufficient direction that the customer only has to be ''eligible'' and not actually enrolled in CAP to be exempt from a deposit request.

 Several parties, including EAP, PPL, FirstEnergy and Columbia ask that we address income verification procedures in the context of the use of the word ''confirmed'' in Section 1404(a.1). (EAP at 5, PPL at 3-4, FirstEnergy at 10-11, Columbia at 4—6). In using the word ''confirmed'' in this Section, the General Assembly likely intended that a self-declaration of eligibility was insufficient to qualify for exemption from a security deposit—that there would be some sort of burden upon the customer or applicant to provide some sort of proof of eligibility. At the same time, we are sensitive to the concerns expressed by some of the parties that any such confirmation procedure not be overly complex or burdensome. We think proposals like PPL's, FirstEnergy's and Columbia's are reasonable. Enrollment in CAP or household income data submitted to the utility (or the utility's agent) or information indicating eligibility for state benefits with income thresholds consistent with the CAP program should all be acceptable means of establishing eligibility for a security deposit waiver. We will revise §§ 56.282 and 56.291 accordingly with this guidance. And as we discuss in reference to §§ 56.32 and 56.282, in response to concerns expressed by OCA and others about the protection of sensitive consumer information, we will add language to § 56.282 at Subsection (3)(iii) that reflects language in the analogous § 56.32 to the effect that ''Public utilities shall take all appropriate actions needed to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of identification information provided by their applicants and customers.''

 Finally, as we did with the analogous §§ 56.32—56.42, we will clarify the applicability of the various sections, noting that in general, §§ 56.282 and 56.288 apply to applicants; while §§ 56.291 and 56.292 apply to customers. We have revised the terminology in these sections accordingly.

§ 56.286. Written procedures.

 We proposed revising this regulation to include incorporation into the utility's written credit procedures the deposit exception in § 56.282 for CAP-eligible applicants, per Section 1404(a.1). We also proposed including in the procedures the availability of alternative credit standards for applicants with a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth which provides clear evidence of domestic violence, in addition to those applicants who have been granted protection from abuse orders, pursuant to Section 1417. We likewise proposed revising paragraph (1) to include a requirement that utilities provide this same information to applicants in writing when credit is denied. These revisions will provide additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V.

 For the reasons OCA discussed relating to §§ 56.32(e) and 56.282(4), OCA asks the Commission to clarify that eligibility for CAP in this context is based on income eligibility, not on eligibility based on some other criteria. Regarding §§ 56.286 and 56.286(1), OCA generally supports the addition of the proposed language but submits that a stakeholder group should be convened to clarify the language relating to victims of domestic violence. (OCA at 29).

Discussion

 We agree with OCA that eligibility for CAP in this context is based upon household income, as discussed previously in relation to § 56.282. We also agree to convene a stakeholder group to address the application of these provisions relating to victims of domestic violence.

§ 56.288. Payment period for deposits by applicants.

 IRRC, along with many of the parties, asked the Commission to clarify the reference to the ''90 days'' deposit payment period in Section 1404 (a) and (h). Does this mean that a customer/applicant has 90 days to pay a deposit in full, regardless of any installment payment plan? Can a utility pursue termination for nonpayment of any deposit installment, regardless whether 90 days passed?

 As we discussed earlier in reference to §§ 56.31—56.57, part of the difficulty here is that the Commission's Chapter 56 regulations have never referred to a ''90-day'' period for paying a deposit. Historically, these regulations have, depending upon the circumstances, either required full immediate payment of a deposit or permitted an installment plan of 50% as an initial payment, followed by 25% billed 30-days later, followed by a final installment of 25% billed 60-days later. The 50/25/25% installment plan, when factoring in 20-day due dates (see 56 Pa. Code § 56.271), does get you into the proximity of ''90-days,'' but not exactly in most cases. Further, we note that historically, the deposit rules have not specified if failure to pay any deposit installment is grounds for termination. We note the comments of parties like PPL, Duquesne, and FirstEnergy who offer that their current practice is to treat failure to pay any deposit installment as grounds for termination.

 While the parties raise many points in both sides of this matter, and arguments could be crafted to support either position, as we discussed earlier in reference to §§ 56.31—56.57, it is nonsensical to have a regulation providing for installment payments if the customer is not required to pay an installment. Therefore, we agree with PPL, Duquesne, and FirstEnergy and conclude that failure to pay a deposit installment by the due date is grounds for termination. To declare otherwise would be to basically declare that installments are not needed at all. We also note that this requirement is not rooted in Chapter 14; therefore, it is not inappropriate to apply it to those customers who are covered by this section. Accordingly, we will insert language in §§ 56.288 and 56.292 to the effect the installment payments must be paid timely and that failure to do so is grounds for termination.

 Also, as we did with § 56.42, we agree to revise this language to specify that the customer has the option to pay the deposit amount in full anytime within 90 days upon determination by the public utility that the deposit is required. We will specify that the customer can pay in full anytime during the 90-day period regardless of whether an installment has been paid or not.

§ 56.291. General rule.

 We proposed new paragraph (4) to align with the new Section 1404(a.1) prohibition on CAP-eligible customers and applicants paying deposits. This revision provides additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V.

 For the same reasons OCA discussed in relation to §§ 56.32(e), 56.282(4), and 56.286, the OCA submits that the Commission should clarify that eligibility for CAP in this context is based on income eligibility, not on eligibility based on some other criteria. (OCA at 29).

Discussion

 As we discussed in relation to §§ 56.32 and 56.282, we agree that it is unlikely that the nuances of each utility's CAP eligibility requirements were what the General Assembly had in mind when it set out this restriction on requiring security deposits. Accordingly, as we did with §§ 56.32 and 56.282, we shall insert language here to the effect that the customer is confirmed to be eligible for a customer assistance program if she or he provides income information to the public utility which verifies that the household income meets the program's income eligibility standard.

§ 56.292.  Payment period for deposits by customers.

 Duquesne suggests adding a sentence at the end of this section consistent with the language in § 56.42 that ''The customer retains the option to pay the deposit amount in full before the due date.'' (Duquesne at 15).

Discussion

 IRRC, along with many of the parties, asked the Commission to clarify the reference to the ''90 days'' deposit payment period in Section 1404(a) and (h). Does this mean that a customer/applicant has 90 days to pay a deposit in full, regardless of any installment payment plan? Can a utility pursue termination for nonpayment of any deposit installment, regardless whether 90 days passed? As we discussed above in reference to § 56.288, we conclude that failure of a customer to pay a deposit installment is grounds for termination. Accordingly, as we did with §§ 56.38, 56.42 and 56.288, we will insert language in § 56.292 to this effect.

 Also, as we did with the above-noted sections, we agree to revise this language to specify that the customer has the option to pay the deposit amount in full anytime within 90 days upon determination by the public utility that the deposit is required. We will specify that they customer can pay in full anytime during the 90-day period regardless of whether an installment has been paid or not.

§ 56.302(4). Deposit hold period and refund.

 Similar to the deletion in § 56.53, Duquesne suggests that the language in § 56.302(4) be revised to remove the 24-month maximum deposit hold to be consistent with changes made in the remaining provisions of Chapter 56, which requires that deposits be held until a timely payment history is established. (Duquesne at 14).

 FirstEnergy notes that although the Commission does not propose any significant changes to 52 Pa. Code § 56.302, they propose one additional change to this section to create consistency throughout the regulations—elimination of the maximum 24-month hold period for deposits. While FirstEnergy acknowledges that Act 155 does not govern the Commission's regulations at 52 Pa. Code §§ 56.251, et seq., they opine that this change should be equally applicable to all customers, including customers with PFAs or other court orders evidencing domestic violence. If a cash deposit is refunded as a result of a maximum hold period, another cash deposit will be charged to the customer the following billing cycle. As a result, customers receive little, if any, benefit from this cash deposit refund. In addition, differentiating between classes of customers will create certain administrative inefficiencies for utilities including system configuration complications. (FirstEnergy at 30-31).

 IRRC also notes that § 56.53(a) is being amended to delete the maximum period of 24 months and asks if the same amendment should be made to § 56.302(4). (IRRC at 5).

Discussion

 Regarding the refund of security deposits, OCA asks that we clarify that the relevant time period concerning refunding a deposit is any 12 consecutive months. We agree and will insert ''any'' in § 56.302(4) as we did at § 56.53. LICRG asks that we order deposits to be refunded if upon later discovery it is determined that the customer has become income-eligible to have a deposit waived. While we acknowledge FirstEnergy's objection to such language as being unnecessary as utilities already have an obligation not to hold security deposits for customers who are confirmed to be eligible for CAP, we think there is value in inserting this in the regulation as to make it clear to all utilities, consumers and advocates. Accordingly, we will insert language to this effect in § 56.302 as we did at § 56.53.

 IRRC questions our proposed retention of the 24-month holding period at § 56.302 and we think FirstEnergy makes a valid point in that retaining this maximum holding period provides very little if any consumer benefit because the utility can simply assess another deposit. While eliminating the maximum holding period is admittedly applying a Chapter 14 provision to victims of domestic violence, we think it has little if any impact from a consumer-benefit perspective. And as FirstEnergy points out, differentiating between classes of customers will create administrative burdens for utilities including system configuration complications, burdens not commensurate with the minimal benefits to customers. Accordingly, we will drop the 24-month maximum holding period in § 56.302 as we did with § 56.53.

§ 56.306. Interest rate.

 We proposed changing the mechanism for determining the interest rate applied to security deposits to align with the change at Section 1404(c)(6). We believe this change is neutral from a customer protection perspective. Whether this change is beneficial compared to the existing language depends upon prevailing interest rates. At times, this revision will favor customers compared to the current rule; at other times, possibly not so. Since the impact on consumers can be both negative and positive, we think making the interest rate calculation the same for all security deposits is the most reasonable approach. Requiring utilities to assess and track differing interest rates on different deposits would impose burdens on utilities while providing no clear benefit to consumers.

Discussion

 We acknowledge that IRRC's concerns with § 56.57 also apply to § 56.306, relating to what interest rate is applied and when and possible confusion with the statutory language. Again, we think it is reasonable to conclude that what the General Assembly intended in Section 1404(c)(6) is to establish a variable interest rate—a rate that changes every January 1. A deposit initially accrues interest at the interest rate in effect at the time the deposit was required. This interest rate remains in effect until the end of that calendar year (December 31). Then on January 1, a new interest rate is determined, and that is the rate that will be applied to the deposit for the calendar year starting January 1 until December 31 of that year, and so on until the deposit is refunded or applied to the account. Accordingly, as we did with § 56.57, we propose adding language to § 56.306 (2) and (3) that will provide some additional guidance (in bold) without changing the intent of this section:

 (2) The interest rate in effect when the deposit is required to be paid shall remain in effect until the date the deposit is refunded or credited, or December 31, whichever is later. A deposit initially accrues interest at the interest rate in effect at the time the deposit was required. This interest rate remains in effect until the end of the calendar year.

 (3) On January 1 of each year, the new interest rate for that year will apply to the deposit. The new interest rate will be applied to the deposit for the calendar year starting January 1 until December 31 of that same year. Revised interest rates are calculated every subsequent January 1 and applied to the deposit until the deposit is refunded or applied to the account.

§ 56.331. General notice provisions and contents of termination notice.

 We proposed revising the information directed to customers on written ten-day termination notices in paragraph (9) to include notice to customers that the special protections available for victims under a protection from abuse order are now also available to those customers with a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth, which provides clear evidence of domestic violence, per Section 1417.

 OCA generally supports the addition of the proposed language but submits that a stakeholder group should be convened to clarify the language relating to victims of domestic violence. (OCA at 30).

Discussion

 As discussed previously, we intend to convene a stakeholder group to discuss the application of the provisions concerning victims of domestic violence.

 To maintain consistency with the terms used in the Emergency Provisions at §§ 56.351—56.358, we will change the reference at § 56.331(7) from ''serious illness notice'' to ''medical certificate notice.''

§ 56.333. Personal contact.

 We proposed revising this section to provide for the optional use of electronic messaging for providing three-day personal notice of termination, per Section 1406(b). This revision provides additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V. We invited comment on the privacy protections and the customer consent practices that should be required in the context of electronic messaging. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1406(b)(1)(ii)(C) and (D).

 As noted in their comments relating to § 56.93, Duquesne believes that having the option of utilizing a more efficient technology to deliver notices in lieu of in person visits or telephone calls should benefit all ratepayers with reduced costs and is more in line with customers' changing needs and preferences. Utilities should be given flexibility to implement procedures consistent with their billing software to allow customers to affirmatively consent to receive electronic notice of issues relating to their account, up to and including termination, and to identify the preferred means for communication of any electronic format such as text, email or a secured login. This consent could be obtained during the application process or during any customer contact—it does not (nor should not) need to be on a standalone basis. Duquesne offers proposed language that, similar to proposed § 56.93(1) and (2), provides guidance concerning what frequency satisfies ''an attempt'' for electronic messaging format, and what should happen if contact is unsuccessful. (Duquesne at 14-15).

 As discussed in their comments regarding the proposed § 56.93, the OCA submits that channels for electronic communications, such as email or text messaging, should be treated in the same manner as telephone numbers and as such should not be disclosed to third parties. (OCA at 30).

 IRRC questions how contact must be made if it is discovered an email address or text message connection is no longer valid. If the electronic contact is not successful, should the personal contact requirement revert to contact in person or by phone? IRRC asks the PUC to clarify in the regulation how a valid personal contact can be accomplished if the electronic contact is not successful. (IRRC at 6).

Discussion

 In response to IRRC's and Duquesne's concerns about what should occur if an electronic contact attempt is not successful, we think Duquesne's proposed language has merit—

Electronic contact shall be deemed complete if, after attempted transmittal, no message is received indicating that the transmittal was undeliverable or otherwise not received. In the event the utility receives notification that the transmittal was undeliverable or otherwise not received, the utility shall attempt to contact the customer either in person or by telephone, consistent with the requirements of this section.

(Duquesne at 15).

 As we discussed relative to § 56.93, we intend to initiate a separate proceeding to establish privacy guidelines as referenced at Section 1406. While the Section 1406 privacy guidelines are pending, we provide the following guidance concerning maintaining the confidentiality of customer information. Electric Distribution Companies (EDCs) and Electric Generation Suppliers (EGSs) are reminded that 52 Pa. Code § 54.8(a) states that an '' . . .EDC or EGS may not release private customer information to a third party unless the customer has been notified of the intent and has been given a convenient method of notifying the entity of the customer's desire to restrict the release of the private information.'' (52 Pa. Code § 54.8(a) relating to Privacy of customer information.) Further, EGSs are reminded that 52 Pa. Code § 54.43(d) states that a '' . . .licensee shall maintain the confidentiality of a consumer's personal information including the name, address and telephone number, and historic payment information, and provide the right of access by the consumer to his own load and billing information.'' (52 Pa. Code § 54.43 relating to Standards of conduct and disclosure for licensees).

 Likewise, Natural Gas Distribution Companies (NGDCs) and Natural Gas Suppliers (NGSs) are reminded that 52 Pa. Code § 62.78(a) requires that an '' . . .NGDC or NGS may not release private customer information to a third party unless the customer has been notified of this intent and has been given a convenient method, consistent with Subsection (b), of notifying the entity of the customer's desire to restrict the release of the private information.'' (52 Pa. Code § 62.78 relating to Privacy of customer information). Further, NGSs are reminded that 52 Pa. Code § 62.114(3) specifies that an NGS '' . . .shall maintain the confidentiality of a consumer's personal information including name, address and telephone number, and historic payment information, and provide the right of access by the consumer to the consumer's own load and billing information.'' (52 Pa. Code § 62.114 relating to Standards of conduct and disclosure for licensees).

 Finally, all utilities that comply with Chapter 56 are reminded that 52 Pa. Code § 56.32 requires that ''Public utilities shall take all appropriate actions needed to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of identification information provided by their applicants and customers.'' (52 Pa. Code § 56.32 relating to Security and cash deposits). As discussed above, we intend to add this language to § 56.282 as to make this same requirement apply to victims of domestic violence.

§ 56.337. Procedures upon customer or occupant contact prior to termination.

 We proposed revising subparagraph (iv) to require utilities to provide universal service program information to consumers upon contact from a consumer during the termination process, pursuant to Section 1410.1(1) and (2).

 As they discussed regarding § 56.97, the OCA supports the proposed revisions as it provides consumers with valuable information regarding universal service programs during the termination process. (OCA at 30).

 EAP, PPL, and FirstEnergy do not believe it is appropriate to require utility employees to provide information on universal service programs to all customers in the termination process. Universal service program eligibility is limited to those with specific incomes. Having to explain universal service programs to all utility customers, regardless of income, would be overly burdensome, time-consuming, and ultimately prove confusing for customers who learn of these programs and are ultimately ineligible to participate. EAP recommends that this language be amended to require utilities to provide information on universal service and customer assistance programs only to those customers the utility knows or reasonably suspects to be low-income or customers who affirm their income would qualify them, or to allow for discretion by utility staff rather than a mandate. (EAP at 10; PPL at 7; FirstEnergy at 18).

 In their comments to § 56.97, EAP, PPL, and PGW suggest removing the words ''authorized,'' ''personnel,'' and ''employee'' from this Subsection in order to allow for automated or self-service options. While customers would always be free to contact the utility to get more information about the termination process, some customers may prefer to receive this information via automation either over the phone or the internet. Having to talk to a live utility employee may feel intimidating to those customers who are under threat of termination; additional flexibility in this circumstance would be beneficial. To that end, EAP suggests a removal of the phrase ''through its employees,'' similar to § 56.97(b), as many utilities also have the means to help customers establish payment arrangements via their website or other secure, automated methods. Again, this modification would not remove the option for customers to speak directly with utility customer service employees if they choose, but rather broaden the options for customers by removing the present limitation of person-only methods.

 EAP recommends a change be made, similar to § 56.97(a)(3), relating to the requirement to provide information about the utility's universal service programs. A broad spectrum of utility customer service employees are trained and equipped to explain and enroll applicants and customers into universal service programs, not only the program administrator. EAP believes that more than one ''administrator'' (by title) at each company is equipped to explain and enroll customers in universal service programs. Accordingly, EAP recommends striking this requirement from the Commission's proposed language. PGW requests that the Commission add additional definitional language regarding who can act as a company's universal service program administrator so as to better serve customers. (EAP at 9—11, PPL at 13—15, PGW at 2-3).

Discussion

 As we noted in our discussion relative to § 56.97, the statute at Section 1410.1(1) is clear that public utilities shall provide information about universal service programs, including customer assistance programs to customers or applicants who contact a public utility to make a payment agreement. If the General Assembly wanted information about universal services programs to only be shared with low-income customers, they could have specified such. Instead, all customers or applicants who contact a public utility to make a payment agreement should be provided information about the utility's universal services program.

 However, we agree that it is nonsensical to provide detailed information and a referral to a customer who is clearly not eligible and/or has no desire in participating in a universal service program. We think a public utility complies with Section 1410.1(1) if they make a good faith effort to inform all termination-related callers about their universal service program (assuming the customer is not already enrolled), how it can benefit the customer, and briefly explain eligibility criteria. If at this point in the conversation it is apparent that the customer would not be eligible or is not interested, the explanation can end and the utility can move on to other matters relating to the termination. If to the contrary the customer appears eligible and is interested, the utility is then obligated to provide additional details and a referral to the program.

 We also, as to facilitate evolving technologies and alternative methods of utility-customer interaction, agree with EAP, PPL, and PGW to remove references to ''employees'' and ''administrators.'' This will also make it unnecessary for the Commission to entertain repeated petitions from utilities related to these provisions.

§ 56.340. Winter termination procedures.

 We proposed revising paragraph (5) to clarify that the February update of the survey of households without heating service in the winter is to include households terminated in December. Commission staff and utilities have encountered questions about this section because the current language is unclear on this point. By failing to include any December terminations, the survey result reported on February 1 is not a complete picture of the households without utility service in the winter. This proposed revision is intended to correct that possible problem.

 OCA believes that the proposed language is consistent with Chapter 14 and they support this clarification as it helps to ensure that all households without heating service during the winter are appropriately accounted for in the Bureau of Consumer Services' report. (OCA at 31).

 In their comments to the analogous § 56.100, PPL submits that landlord ratepayers are only covered by the winter termination provision of Chapter 14 if the household's income is at or below 250% of the federal poverty leve1. PPL points out that Chapter 14 explicitly provides that the Commission shall not prohibit an electric distribution utility or natural gas distribution utility from terminating service in accordance with this section to customers with household incomes exceeding 250% of the Federal poverty level. Likewise, FirstEnergy states that landlord ratepayers generally do not qualify as low-income customers, and therefore receive a benefit that is unavailable to all other customers. FirstEnergy has previously encountered challenges collecting payment from landlord ratepayers and this prohibition against winter termination for nonpayment permits landlords to further postpone payment and increase their arrearages. (PPL at 16, FirstEnergy at 22).

 FirstEnergy also recommends that the Commission combine the December 15 and February 1 reports into a single report and modify the submission date for the report to January 15. This report would include survey results for all customers with heat related service who were terminated in the prior year. FirstEnergy further proposes that utilities be permitted to conduct the survey in person, by telephone, by mail, or electronically, where authorized by the customer. Where utilities do not reach the customer using one method of contact, they will reach out to the customer via a different method of contact. (FirstEnergy at 21-22).

 LICRG, in their comments referring to § 56.100(j), submit that the language limiting public access to information about deaths occurring where utility service had been terminated should be removed. They believe it is clearly in the public interest in protecting the health and welfare of Commonwealth residents that any structural or systemic failures or gaps in protecting the impoverished and other vulnerable populations are revealed. (LICRG at 43—46).

 In their additional comments, FirstEnergy opposes LICRG's request to make § 56.100(j) reports public. FirstEnergy believes that public availability of this information would constitute a violation of the Public Utility Code, Pennsylvania's Right-to-Know Law, and Commission precedent and regulations, as well as would raise a host of public policy concerns. Section 56.100(j) reports are a subset of the reporting obligations required under 66 Pa.C.S. § 1508 and Section 1508 reports ''shall not be open for public inspection, except by order of the commission, and shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter or thing mentioned in such report.'' Accordingly, the same restrictions should apply to § 56.100(j) reports.

 Additionally, the Right-to-Know Law bars disclosure of utilities' § 56.100(j) reports to the public. Utilities prepare 52 Pa. Code § 56.100(j) reports based on an internal investigation. When the Commission receives these reports, the Commission will review the reports and possibly seek additional information from utilities. Under the Right-to-Know Law, Pennsylvania agencies are prohibited from disclosing to the public any record related to a noncriminal investigation including ''investigative materials, notes, correspondence and reports. . . . '' Further, public availability of § 56.100(j) reports would raise significant customer privacy concerns. When a utility submits a report to the Commission pursuant to § 56.100(j), the entire report consists of customer-specific information. If the public may access this report, any third party would have access to this private customer information. (FirstEnergy Additional Comment at 16—19).

Discussion

 FirstEnergy is proposing one survey that would be due in January and would include the December terminations. Staff is concerned about the elimination of the re-survey of customers that now occurs in January with the results due to the Commission on February 1. By eliminating the re-survey, there will be no way of knowing how many households restored their utility service. Therefore, we are keeping with our proposed language.

 PPL and FirstEnergy propose that a public utility be permitted to terminate service to landlord-ratepayer accounts during the period of December 1 through March 31. The problem with this proposal is that utilities have little or no way of knowing the income level of the tenants involved in landlord-ratepayer accounts, given that they have little or no contact with tenants who are not their customers. It is then possible that low-income tenants could be terminated while the law clearly prohibits the termination of low-income customers after November 30 and before April 1. Accordingly, we must reject this proposal and will maintain the existing prohibition on terminating landlord-ratepayer accounts in the winter.

 Regarding LICRG's comments that reports submitted under §§ 56.100(j) and/or 56.340(7) should be made public, we decline to do so. This reporting requirement is related to 66 Pa.C.S. § 1508; and this Section specifically states that reports are not open for public inspection. Also, as FirstEnergy points out, disclosing this information would likely result in divulging private customer information without the knowledge or consent of the customer and/or other individuals involved in the event.

§ 56.351. General provision.

 We refer to physician assistants in addition to physician and nurse practitioner in order to align with the new definition at Section 1403. This revision provides additional protections to the customers covered by subchapters L—V.

 The OCA supports this modification as it makes it possible for a variety of qualified medical professionals to submit documents necessary to obtain a medical certificate. (OCA at 31).

Discussion

 No party questioned our proposed addition of physician assistants to physician and nurse practitioner as medical professionals qualified to authorize a medical certificate, so we will proceed as proposed.

§ 56.353. Medical certifications.

 We refer to physician assistants in addition to physician and nurse practitioner in order to align with the new definition at Section 1403. We also proposed revising this section to make it similar to the changes we are proposing to the analogous § 56.113, specifically by removing the requirements in § 56.353(3) and (4), which require the medical certificate to include the ''nature and anticipated length of the affliction'' and the ''specific reason for which the service is required.'' This section currently requires the medical professional to divulge information about the patient's medical condition to the utility—contrary to the privacy and confidentiality of personal medical information that patients have come to expect. Accordingly, we proposed eliminating the ''nature'' of the affliction and ''the specific reason for which service is required'' as part of this regulation. However, we do not see the ''length of the affliction'' at § 56.353(3) as being contrary to patient expectations of privacy; in fact, the utility needs to know this information to determine the duration of the medical certificate. See 52 Pa. Code § 56.354. Some parties have previously suggested that the medical professional's license number be included as a required element on a medical certificate. We invited parties to comment on this possibility.

 Many of the comments filed in relation to § 56.113 are also of relevance to § 56.353. Per their comments in relation to § 56.113, the OCA supports the proposed revisions because it reflects the Commission's Implementation Order and provides clarity. (OCA at 31). The CAC believes it is unnecessary to require a medical professional's license number on a medical certificate and that this would impose needless formality to the process of submitting a medical certificate. (CAC at 11—14).

 The Joint Commenters assert that the Commission's proposed revisions to § 56.113 strike the correct balance and provide necessary information without being unduly intrusive on a utility customer's privacy with regard to their health status. However, the Joint Commenters oppose inclusion of a certifying professional's license number on a medical certificate because requiring a medical professional to provide their license number on a medical certificate implies a level of personal liability and is likely to deter medical professionals from assisting patients.

 Regarding the ''form'' requirement, the Joint Commenters agree with the Commission that no specific form should be required to be used if all the relevant information is presented by the medical professional. The Joint Commenters report that a lack of clarity about the medical certifications has led several of the largest healthcare systems to prohibit physicians from issuing medical certificates for their patients, resulting in many of their clients being unable to obtain the protection from imminent termination afforded by the Legislature. Upon the conclusion of this rulemaking, the Joint Commenters recommend that the Commission institute a collaborative work group of interested stakeholders and staff from the Commission's Bureau of Consumer Services and Communications Department to develop a single, voluntary, standardized form. (Joint Commenters at 5—17).

 LICRG supports the Commission's determination that a medical certificate does not need to be on a prescribed form and recommends that the Commission consider adopting a form that utilities could implement as a safe harbor that complies with the requirements of § 56.113. (LICRG at 34—37). LICRG urges the Commission to reject attempts to further complicate the medical certificate form requirements, including the inclusion of licensing information on all certificates and a requirement that a medical certificate be produced on letterhead of the certifying medical professional. This would impede access to medical certificates particularly from nurse practitioners and physicians' assistants who may not have access to or authorization from a medical practice to utilize its letterhead. LICRG further notes the arguments some parties raise to the effect that the regulations lack clarity regarding the relationship required for medical certification protections to apply; i.e. they should be limited to ''permanent'' household members. LICRG points out that there is no requirement in Chapter 14 that the household member be a ''permanent'' member of the customer's household. (LICRG Additional Comment at 6—15).

 FirstEnergy recommends the same changes to this regulation as they discussed relative to § 56.113. In addition, they do not support oral medical certificates for customers with PFAs or other court orders demonstrating evidence of domestic violence. To minimize the potential for medical certificate fraud and abuse, written medical certificates should be required for all customers. To the extent the Commission is concerned regarding the ease of obtaining a written medical certificate for these customers, FirstEnergy offers two different methods for obtaining a medical certificate: the customer may either request the utility to send a form to his or her physician, nurse practitioner, or physician assistant, or medical certificate information may be submitted on the letterhead of the medical professional. (FirstEnergy at 31).

 FirstEnergy believes that posting medical certificates online exposes the process to an increase in medical certificate fraud as compared to the current preferred practice of faxing or emailing the forms directly to the relevant medical professional. Where the forms are available for download online, customers without legitimate medical issues would have unbridled access to the forms. Along the same lines, FirstEnergy believes the medical license number of medical professionals should be required information on a medical certificate form, particularly if medical certificate forms are posted online. Medical professional names, addresses, and phone numbers are easily accessible online. Although medical license numbers are also often accessible as well, they require additional research and can be confirmed, which provides an extra safeguard against forged medical certificates. (FirstEnergy Additional Comment at 5—9).

 EAP suggests additional language at § 56.113 requiring the medical professional's license number as well as a requirement that the certification be on the medical professional's letterhead or other official paperwork if it is not on a utility-generated form, to afford protection for the utility against fraud or medical certificate abuse. Licensed medical professionals utilize their license number for a variety of routine matters, including items such as prescriptions to ensure validity and avoid fraud, and medical certificates should be treated likewise, with EAP reporting that utilities have not had any issues requesting this information from medical professionals. In addition, EAP continues to agree with the position of the Commission and the advocates that utilities are not in the position to determine who qualifies for a medical certificate. (EAP at 13—18).

 PPL recommends removing the current requirement that medical certificates include the anticipated length of the affliction, as required by § 56.113(3). Further, PPL recommends that the medical professional certifying the medical certificate include his or her license identification number as an additional measure against fraud or abuse. (PPL at 8—11).

 PGW supports the intent of the Commission to provide easy accessibility to a utility's medical certification form but does not support the requirement that the utility place the form on its website. PGW is concerned about the potential for fraud that could occur by making its medical certification form generally available. Also, to help prevent fraud, PGW fully supports a requirement that the certificate include the medical professional's license number. A medical professional should easily have a record of their license number so this requirement is not likely to be burdensome. (PGW at 5-6).

 To ensure the validity of the customer's medical request, Columbia suggests that the utility's medical certificate form or any correspondence submitted by the health care professional include the professional's state issued license number. Furthermore, if the attending medical professional does not utilize the company's designated medical certificate form, Columbia suggests that that they be required to provide the required information on the medical practice's letterhead. (Columbia at 6-7).

 Duquesne agrees with the Commission's characterization of revised Section 1403 that the use of the word ''form'' does not mean that a specific document must be used but instead a Commission-approved manner. Accordingly, Duquesne does not believe there is any need for a statewide mandated form for use by all utilities, noting that it makes its form generally available for use by medical professionals on its website or upon request. Duquesne is in favor of including the medical professional's license number as this provides the utility with a quick and easy method to investigate the validity of any questionable certificates. Further, such a requirement is consistent with other requirements for professionals (such as attorneys providing their license numbers on filings) and is not unduly burdensome or time consuming. (Duquesne at 7-8).

 IRRC has two concerns. First, is the medical certificate form required to be approved by the PUC? If so, the regulation should include this requirement. Second, § 56.113 was amended to only permit medical certificates to be in writing. Should a similar amendment be made to this section? The PUC should explain why § 56.113 and this section differ. (IRRC at 6).

Discussion

 As noted in our earlier discussion of § 56.113, there is general agreement with the Commission's position that the word form in the definition of Medical Certificate at Section 1403 does not literally mean a ''form.'' There were also no objections voiced to the Commission's proposed removal of the ''nature'' of the medical condition and the ''specific reason for which the service is required'' from the medical certificate. Beyond these things however, there are differing opinions as to what elements should the form of a medical certificate include. LICRG and the Joint Commenters suggest that, while a standard form should not be required, there may be some use in creating an optional, standard, statewide format as to provide greater consistency in the application of the medical certificate rules. We think there is merit in their suggestions that some type of informal, statewide collaborative should be convened to develop such a format. Once these new rules are in place, the Bureau of Consumer Services will convene an informal stakeholder group consisting of advocates, utilities, medical professionals and any other interested party to discuss and recommend a standard statewide format to the Commission.

 Concerning the format, the parties had very differing views on whether the medical professional's license number should be required on the certificate. EAP, Duquesne, PPL, FirstEnergy, PGW and Columbia supported the idea as a possible means to prevent fraud. LICRG, Joint Commenters, and the CAC oppose the idea as imposing an unnecessary burden on medical professionals and not being an effective means to prevent supposed fraud. Because we had no medical professionals that submitted comments, we are uncomfortable deciding one way or the other on this matter. We think it would be preferable to leave this as a topic for discussion in the above-noted collaborative process intended to develop a standard format.

 There were also divergent views on whether medical certificate formats should be posted on utility websites. LICRG thought this would be helpful in providing quick and easy access for both consumers and medical professionals. However, EAP, PPL, FirstEnergy and PGW expressed concerns that posting this information on their websites could facilitate forgeries, while Aqua noted that they already post the certificate format on their website. Again, we think this may be an issue best left to the above-noted statewide collaborative, where advocates, utilities and medical professionals can discuss this with each other and make a recommendation to the Commission. Accordingly, we will revise our proposed changes to § 56.353 to omit any reference to posting on the public utility's website.

 Regarding IRRC's question about the need to specify what it meant by the phrase ''in a form approved by the Commission,'' we note that while we proposed allowing utilities to develop their own form (and some already do so), the Commission does not have to review or approve such forms. We note that the forms do have to comply with §§ 56.113 and 56.353. We agree with LICRG and decline to tamper with the Section 1403 definition by inserting ''permanent'' in reference to the ''member of the customer's household.'' We are not convinced that this is enough of an issue to lead us to alter a statutory definition. Finally, FirstEnergy and IRRC have concerns with verbal medical certificates and question why § 56.113 and § 56.353 differ. The reason for the difference is that § 56.113 reflects Chapter 14 requirements while § 56.353 is the regulation for those customers exempt from Chapter 14 per Section 1417 (those with a PFA or a court order that provides clear evidence of domestic violence). For example, while the reauthorized Chapter 14 at Section 1403 specifies a Medical Certificate must be a ''written document,'' this requirement does not apply to those customers covered by the Section 1417 exemption, thus permitting verbal medical certificates as Chapter 56 had traditionally allowed prior to Chapter 14. Verbal medical certificates provide an additional option for victims of domestic violence, as intended by Section 1417.

§ 56.354. Length of postponement; renewals.

 While we proposed no revisions to this section, several parties filed comments related to the length of postponements provided by a medical certificate under § 56.114, which is also of relevance to § 56.354.

 LICRG submits that, given that medical professionals may determine that a chronic or life-threatening illness is anticipated to extend beyond a period of 30 days, it is appropriate to provide for the certification of a medical need for service that corresponds to the affliction. Obtaining a medical certificate is not easy and requires customers to expend their limited financial resources every 30 days to pay expensive co-pays, secure transportation and childcare, and take time away from work to attend a medical appointment. For someone with a short-term condition which is likely to improve, the shorter time-frame may be reasonable; but for those with a chronic illness, the arbitrarily imposed 30-day limitation may have no relation to the underlying illness or condition. In the event of a serious illness without specific ending date, the duration of the medical certificate protection should be extended for a period of up to 6 months. (LICRG at 34—37).

 The Joint Commenters suggest that the Commission should revise § 56.114 to extend the re-certification period for medical certificates where the customer or household member has a chronic or extended medical condition. Visiting a healthcare provider to obtain a medical certificate to prevent termination of critical, life-sustaining utility service comes at a cost as there are typically co-pays or office visit fees. There are also often additional costs—including transportation, time off work, and childcare—that further add to the household's financial burden. As currently structured, the medical certificate process requires a household to incur these costs every 30 days, even when the illness or medical condition will continue for more than 30 days. To minimize the added financial burden to households, the Joint Commenters urge the Commission to allow a certifying professional to specify the length of a medical certificate, based on the individual's health needs. (Joint Commenters at 5—17).

 The CAC supports the Commission's proposed elimination of language concerning the ''nature'' of an affliction and ''the specific reason for which service is required'' and supports the current requirement of the ''anticipated length of the affliction'' for medical certificates to the extent that the medical professional believes that the duration of the illness will be greater than 30 days. This would enable the utility to accommodate a medical certificate of greater length. The CAC notes that there is nothing in the statute about a 30-day period and that there are chronic illnesses that persist for far longer periods of time. Accordingly, the CAC submits that the regulations should clarify that although a medical certificate shall be effective for a minimum of 30 days, in the cases in which the medical practitioner indicates the anticipated length of the affliction to be greater than 30 days, the length of the protection provided should correspond to the length of the affliction. In the event of a chronic or terminal illness without specific ending date, medical certificates should be permitted for a period of a maximum of 6 months. (CAC at 11—14).

 Extending the renewal time for medical certifications would allow a greater buffer for families of those with special healthcare needs to get back on their feet. Additionally, they urge that information about medical certificate regulations should be clearly communicated to all applicants. (Center for Hunger-Free Communities at 3).

 The Health & Housing Coalition note that chronic medical conditions are not going to resolve in 30 days, so requesting a new certificate from a medical professional every 30 days is a burden without a benefit. They note that multiple states provide for medical certificates that last significantly longer than 30 days for persons with serious, chronic conditions, including Montana and Massachusetts that offer 180 days; New Hampshire, and Oregon up to 12 months. Other states, like Connecticut and Rhode Island, give more discretion to the medical provider about the length of the certificate. The Health & Housing Coalition urges the PUC to extend the duration of medical certificates for persons with serious, chronic conditions and to take steps to make sure that consumers and medical professionals are better informed about the medical certificate process. (Health & Housing Coalition Additional Comment at 8—11).

 PPL submits that recommendations to extend the medical certificate period beyond 30 days offers a short-term solution that creates long-term problems for customers and utilities. A customer that has a medical certificate that extends for several months could potentially stop paying for utility service during this extended period. Although this may seem a benefit for a household experiencing an illness, a medical certificate is not a free pass to customers unable to pay for utility service. The customer's charges during this period will accrue and eventually need to be paid to the utility, and at this point the balance may be unmanageable and lead to termination. As such, PPL submits that extending the duration of medical certificates for longer than 30 days neither balances the interests of customers with the utility, nor serves the intent behind medical certificates. (PPL Additional Comment at 6—8).

Discussion

 This topic, the 30-day limit per medical certificate found in §§ 56.114 and 56.354, was addressed in the 2011 rulemaking proceeding. LICRG, Joint Commenters, CAC, Center for Hunger-Free Communities, and the Health and Housing Coalition request that the Commission consider long-term medical certificates to address chronic or long-term illnesses. These parties raise several concerns about the burden the current 30-day limit imposes on patients and health-care professionals alike, such as the need to schedule repeated appointments with a medical professional, transportation to appointments, and accessibility to medical care. However, we are reluctant to revise the regulations in this regard because the General Assembly had an opportunity to do so when it reauthorized Chapter 14 and declined. Long-term medical certificates were not provided for in the legislation and would be a very substantive addition to these regulations.

 We again note that in Section 1406(f), the General Assembly declared that the '' . . .medical certificate procedure shall be implemented in accordance with Commission regulations.'' It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly was familiar with the 30-day timeframe in the current regulations and was comfortable with it. It is also important to note that when it reauthorized Chapter 14, also as noted above, it expanded the list of medical professionals authorized to provide medical certificates to include physician assistants. It is not unreasonable to think that the General Assembly did this to help address the concerns with patients accessing medical care. We also remind everyone that there is no limit on medical certificates as long as the customer is paying bills per §§ 56.116 and 56.356. The limits on medical certificate usage only apply if the customer is not meeting their obligations at §§ 56.116 and 56.356.

§ 56.356. Duty of customer to pay bills.

 While we proposed no revisions to this section, several parties filed comments related to the duty of customers to pay bills while protected by a medical certificate under the analogous section § 56.116, as discussed in detail earlier.

 LICRG supports the Commission's long-standing interpretation of §§ 56.114 and 56.116, which allows households to renew a medical certificate for as long as is medically necessary, provided the customer pays their current charges or budget bill amount as it comes due, irrespective of any arrears on the account at the time the medical certificate is first obtained. If customers were required to pay more than current, undisputed charges, the purpose of medical certificates and renewals would be thwarted. (LICRG at 38-39).

 The CAC likewise submits that the purpose of medical certificates and renewals would be thwarted by requirements to pay more than current, undisputed charges. Requiring a customer in a time of illness and increased vulnerability to make payments in excess of current charges would fail to effectuate the fundamental purpose of a medical certificate—to interrupt the utility's termination-collection path while a medical need for service exists. (CAC at 11—14).

 EAP notes that low-income customers enrolled in universal service programs are asked to make good faith payments to the utility to address their debt. The purpose of this treatment is twofold: to encourage good payment behavior by the individual customer and to help ease the burden of uncollectable expenses on the remainder of the customer base. EAP believes those customers utilizing the protection of a medical certificate should be held to this same standard. (EAP at 13—18).

 FirstEnergy notes that these regulations could be interpreted to allow a customer to apply for an unlimited number of medical certificates as long as they have met their obligation to pay current undisputed bills, even if the customer fails to reduce his or her arrearages. FirstEnergy encourages the Commission to clarify whether customers who fail to pay their arrearages are eligible for an unlimited number of medical certificates as long as they are paying current bills, or if they are eligible for only two medical certificate renewals until their arrearages are paid off. FirstEnergy does not believe the legislature intended for medical certificates to provide an indefinite loophole to termination. Accordingly, FirstEnergy requests that the Commission limit the number of medical certificates that may be obtained while customers continue to have an outstanding balance. (FirstEnergy at 23—27).

Discussion

 Regarding §§ 56.116 and 56.356 and the customer's obligation to pay while under the protection of a medical certificate, again the parties are continuing an argument that was also presented to the Commission in the 2011 proceeding. LICRG, Joint Commenters, and CAC urge the Commission to keep in place the regulation adopted in 2011 that requires a customer to pay current bill amounts while under the protection of a medical certificate. However, EAP, FirstEnergy, PECO and Aqua all argue that the customer's obligation to pay should be expanded to include either part of or all of the customer's arrearage, in addition to current bills. They argue that there is nothing to prevent a customer from filing unlimited medical certificates, and thus never having to pay toward their accumulated past arrearage.

 The reauthorization of Chapter 14 did not result in any new statutory language to guide us here or require us to revise the payment obligation of the customer. While we understand the utilities' concerns with the payment of the outstanding balance, we must reject their suggestion that we require an arrangement on all current and overdue balances because this likely would be considered a payment arrangement, which may conflict with Section 1405(d)'s restrictions on the Commission's authority to order payment arrangements. This same complication was present in 2011, and nothing in the reauthorized Chapter 14 provides us with anything to get past that complication. We point out that if the customer is paying their current bills as required by this section, the outstanding balance will not be increasing, meaning that the customer's and the utility's problems with the account balance will not be aggravated. We expect that once the medical certificate expires, the utility would address the outstanding balance with the customer. We also point to the petition process at §§ 56.118 and 56.358 that a utility may use to contest the validity of medical certificates that they believe are being filed with the intention of avoiding any payment toward the arrearages for an extended period of time.

§ 56.392. Commission informal complaint procedure.

 We proposed adding language to paragraph (1) to permit an informal complainant to receive a copy of the documents the utility provides Commission staff in response to an informal complaint. The opportunity to review this information is intended to protect the complainant's due process rights. We acknowledged that there may be some relatively rare instances where these documents may refer to parties other than the complainant. In these instances, the utility is directed to redact any information that may compromise the privacy or personal security of a third party.

 The CAC commends the Commission for making this information available to complainants as it is essential that individuals who have an informal complaint with their utility be able to see the information provided by the utility to the Commission. Additionally, while the Council understands the Commission's concern for the privacy of third parties, it believes that the proposed language as written may be overly restrictive. There are circumstances in which the redaction or unavailability of information concerning third parties may impede the need for the complainant to receive information necessary to prosecute his or her claim. For instance, in the case of a tenant seeking to demonstrate that a utility has wrongfully terminated service in violation of the Discontinuance of Service to Leased Premises Act, the complainant would be specifically asserting a right as a non-customer. In such circumstance, the third party, the tenant's landlord or its agent, may be the utility's customer, and information about that third party is material to the complaint. There may be other circumstances in which the Commission's determination hinges on information concerning third parties and such information should not be categorically unavailable to an affected complainant. While the CAC does not have a specific recommendation, the regulation should make clear that information relevant to the Commission's decision should be turned over to the complainant, unless the utility demonstrates that information would jeopardize the personal security of any third party, at which point the utility should provide redacted information and an explanation of the reason for the redaction. (CAC at 14—16).

Discussion

 As we discussed relative to § 56.163, we are withdrawing the proposed revision of § 56.392 (as we did with the analogous § 56.163) due to the concerns expressed by some of the parties that redacting information would likely increase personnel and costs and that redacting information could delay the utilities response to the informal complaint. However, Commission staff reserves the right to have the utility provide individuals with the company report when the situation warrants it.

 Though we are withdrawing the proposed language that the public utility provide the complainant with a copy of the documents submitted to the Commission staff in response to the informal complaint, we remind public utilities of the Public Utility Company Dispute Procedures found at §§ 56.151 and 56.381:

§ 56.381. General rule.

Upon initiation of a dispute covered by this section, the public utility shall: . . . . . .

(5) Within 30 days of the initiation of the dispute, issue its report to the complaining party. The public utility shall inform the complaining party that the report is available upon request.

(i) If the complainant is not satisfied with the dispute resolution, the utility company report must be in writing and conform to § 56.382 (relating to contents of the public utility company report). Further, in these instances, the written report shall be sent to the complaining party if requested or if the public utility deems it necessary.

 If a utility has correctly implemented the Chapter 56 dispute procedures, and if the customer files an informal complaint, the company should have a utility company report, in writing per the above-noted regulations, on file at the time the PUC informs the utility of the filing of an informal complaint. In addition, public utilities should also be informing complainants that the written report is available to them and can be sent to complainants.

§ 56.403. Review from informal complaint decisions of the Bureau of Consumer Services.

 We proposed revising this language to clarify that the burden of proof remains with the party who filed the informal complaint. This language simply makes this provision consistent with existing Commission practices.

 As it similarly discussed regarding § 56.173, the OCA submits that the legal standard of burden of proof is misapplied in the context of an informal complaint, and as such the proposed change is not appropriate in this context. (OCA at 32).

Discussion

 As we did with the analogous § 56.173, we will clarify that this Section is referring to the burden of proof for the formal complaint. The proposed change to §§ 56.173 and 56.403 is also consistent with a recent Commission decision on this issue in Kelvin Thomas.

 In Kelvin Thomas, the Commission noted that, ''[i]n a de novo appeal from a decision of the BCS, the burden of proof remains with the party who filed the original informal complaint, except for legal or policy issues raised by the utility on appeal.'' Id. at 8-9. The Commission continued that for legal or policy issues raised by the utility, ''it would be absurd to impose the burden of proof concerning a legal and policy issue upon a customer who did not raise the issue and who probably has little knowledge of the issue itself.'' Id. It is also legally correct that a party bears the burden of proof and/or persuasion on defenses it may assert against a customer's complaint. We propose to modify the language in § 56.403 (and in the analogous § 56.173) further to allow for the exception in the case of legal and policy issues as per the Commission decision in Kelvin Thomas.

§ 56.421. Payment and timing.

 We proposed revising paragraph (7) to ensure that the information notifying customers that the special protections that may be available for victims under a protection from abuse order may also now be available to those customers with a court order providing clear evidence of domestic violence and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth, per Section 1417.

 OCA generally supports the addition of the proposed language but submits that a stakeholder group should be convened to clarify the language relating to victims of domestic violence. (OCA at 32).

 FirstEnergy filed comments regarding § 56.191 that are relevant to § 56.421, suggesting new language addressing restoration of service where the company employee was subject of previous threats by the customer. FirstEnergy asks for additional time to restore service and to assess additional fees when dealing with such situations and customers. (FirstEnergy at 29).

 PECO suggests a change be made to § 56.191(c)(2) that is relevant to § 56.421, pointing to various provisions of the regulation that states a utility must take certain actions depending upon the income level of the customer or applicant. PECO believes that when the regulations provide for disparate treatment based on income, the regulations should refer to ''verified income'' rather than merely ''income.'' Otherwise, customers and applicants can receive preferential treatment whether they truly have lower income or not. (PECO at 7).

Discussion

 As we did regarding § 56.191, we agree with OCA that the Commission should retain its proposed language codifying the expanded statutory exemption, and then convene a working group of all interested stakeholders. The purpose of this working group would be to develop recommendations to the Commission about guidance and interpretation of Section 1417 that could lead to the development of a policy statement to be applied across utility service territories. This group could also advise the Commission on other implementation issues, such as developing appropriate notice of the domestic violence exemption to consumers, training and consumer education materials, and confidentiality expectations for handling information about a customer's status as a victim of domestic violence. The comments submitted on these matters, as noted above, can serve as the initial discussion points for the working groups' exploration of these issues.

 We decline to tamper with the statutory language we are incorporating into this section by inserting ''verified'' as PECO wishes. For similar reasons, we have concerns with FirstEnergy's proposed five-day reconnection timeframe when a utility employee was previously threatened by an applicant or customer. As we discussed relative to § 56.191, the General Assembly set clear timeframes to reconnect service once an applicant has met all applicable conditions in Section 1407 and we prefer not to alter those timeframes. Utilities are not required to do anything that would compromise the safety of a person or the integrity of the public utility's delivery system, and threats of violence should be brought to the attention of local law enforcement.

§ 56.431. Public information.

 We proposed revising paragraph (13) to ensure that the information directed to customers concerning the special protections that may be available for victims under a protection from abuse order may now also be available to those customers with a court order providing clear evidence of domestic violence and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth, per Section 1417.

 OCA submits that a stakeholder group should be convened to clarify the language relating to victims of domestic violence, but in general the OCA supports the addition of the proposed language. (OCA at 32).

Discussion

 As discussed previously, we intend to convene a stakeholder group, as suggested by OCA, to further address the language concerning victims of domestic violence.

§ 56.461. Reporting requirements.

 We proposed removing § 56.461 and moving these requirements to the new § 56.231(d). Consolidating utility reporting requirements into one section of the regulations will assist utilities in locating and complying with these requirements.

Discussion

 No party voiced objections with our proposal to consolidate the § 56.461 reporting requirements into a revised § 56.231, so we will proceed with this consolidation as proposed.

Appendices

 We updated the Appendices with the revised statute to include the added PFA/domestic violence notification language. We also changed the cross references in these sections to be consistent with the other changes to each section that references the Appendices.

Statement of Commissioner Andrew G. Place

 Before the Commission today for consideration is a Final Rulemaking to Amend the Provisions of 52 Pa. Code, Chapter 56 to Comply with the Amended Provisions of 66 Pa.C.S. Chapter 14. The changes to Chapter 56 encompass certain standards and billing practices to comply with Act 155 of 2014, as well as other changes to update the regulations. Of these changes, I would like to highlight one. In Subchapter C, Credit and Deposit Standards Policy Procedures for Applicants, we are amending the policy statement to further identify protected classes of citizens and customers in Pennsylvania.

 In Governor Tom Wolf's 2018 Executive Order establishing the Pennsylvania Commission on LGBTQ Affairs,¹⁹ he acknowledges the ''unique, diverse and valuable contributions to the culture, society and economy of Pennsylvania'' from LGBTQ Pennsylvanians. Governor Wolf further indicates that the Commonwealth is committed to providing equality and opportunity for all its citizens. The Commission could not agree more, and as part of today's amendments to Chapter 56, we are expanding the anti-discrimination language of Chapter 56 to now include protections for ''color, religious creed, ancestry, union membership, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, AIDS or HIV status or disability.''

 With these changes we can all ensure that continued and equal access to utility service is preserved for all of Pennsylvania's citizens.

ANDREW G. PLACE, 
Commissioner

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¹⁷  Pennsylvania Right to Know Law (RTK), 65 P.S. §§ 67.101, et seq. For more information on the PUC's ''Right to Know'' procedures, see http://www.puc.pa.gov/filing_resources/obtain/file_information/right_to_know_policies_and_procedures.aspx.

¹⁸  See Petition of PECO Energy Company for Temporary Waiver of Regulations Related to the Required Days In a Billing Period, Docket P-2014-2446292 (Order entered December 4, 2014).

¹⁹  Executive Order 2018-06 establishing the Pennsylvania Commission on LGBTQ Affairs. August 6, 2018. https//www.oa.pa.gov/Policies/eo/Documents/2018-06.pdf.

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